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CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND NEPA: OVERCOMING THE
REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE DEFENSE
ALANA M. WASE ∗
The sheer number of lawsuits filed annually regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) represents the law’s potential. Despite the fact that NEPA’s requirements have been interpreted
as purely procedural, 1 NEPA remains an enormously useful tool for
environmental protection. While lawyers continue to sort out NEPA’s
utility in combating climate change, this Comment will advocate that
an effective parallel can be drawn between NEPA’s application in the
nuclear context and NEPA’s application to greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions. Interpreting NEPA this way ensures optimal application.
Many of the difficulties in applying NEPA to GHG emissions have already been encountered and litigated in the nuclear context. The
environmental risks posed by nuclear waste and GHG emissions are
equally difficult to predict with precision, yet both remain extremely
2
dangerous. Additionally, recent case law provides an instructive focal
point for further considering the parallel and surmounting a common pitfall facing petitioners invoking NEPA when alleging inade3
quate climate change analysis.
4
Specifically, in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
established a new reference point in the unfolding NEPA case law.
The court’s holding illuminates a murky area of NEPA, in which enviCopyright © 2013 by Alana M. Wase.
∗
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1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. 681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Hereinafter, this Comment will refer to this case as
New York v. NRC.
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ronmental impacts that are “remote or speculative” need not be considered. Although the test of what is “remote or speculative” remains
difficult to define, New York v. NRC at least identifies a scenario that is
not so uncertain as to preclude consideration in an environmental
impact statement (“EIS”)—the possibility that a permanent repository
5
for spent nuclear fuel may fail to exist in thirty years. Although the
holding pertains most directly to NEPA in the context of nuclear
power, this Comment will argue that the significance of this decision
should be broader, as it is applicable to all NEPA challenges including
those involving climate change impacts.
This Comment will explain that this case could be a useful tool in
the ongoing effort to require NEPA analyses to include sound consid6
erations of climate change. The jurisprudence on climate change
consideration in NEPA analyses is still very much in development. In
7
its current form, it is both incomplete and inconsistent. Advocates
seeking more thorough and consistent analysis of climate change impacts in EISs should use this ruling as a rebuttal to the “remote and
speculative” defense that precludes consideration of climate change
8
from NEPA analyses. In particular, the decision may be used as
proof that while the modeling of climate change impacts is not exact,
agencies are not prevented from including detailed calculations of
climate change impacts, which are no less uncertain than nuclear
storage risks.
Part I will lay out the current state of NEPA litigation regarding
climate change including a detailed look at the NEPA statute and
9
regulations, the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) guid10
ance concerning climate change consideration, and the current
state of federal circuit court decisions applying climate change in
11
12
NEPA analyses. It will also introduce the New York v. NRC decision.
Part II will analyze the state of climate change consideration in
NEPA, concluding that there is significant room for improvement.
Next, it will apply the New York v. NRC holding to existing case law

5. See infra Part I.D.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part I.D.
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and argue that the decision could eliminate a barrier in NEPA’s ability to consider climate change. Principally, the holding arms courts
with a new point of comparison on the threshold certainty required
for considering climate change in an environmental assessment
(“EA”) or EIS. This Part will urge application of New York v. NRC to
preclude agencies from asserting that GHG emissions from a proposed project are too “remote and speculative” as to require consideration in determining the proposal’s environmental impact. Equally
important, this Comment will argue that the decision should be used
to require a more thorough analysis of GHG considerations than the
cursory review that has become customary in the few proposals including GHG impacts in their analyses. In sum, this Comment will advocate for increased climate change considerations in NEPA and will
suggest that the New York v. NRC decision offers a new point of persuasion as federal circuits are increasingly called upon to address
when and in what level of detail climate change must be factored into
NEPA.
I. BACKGROUND
The National Environmental Policy Act was signed into law in
13
1970. The purpose of NEPA is two-fold: (1) to establish a national
14
environmental policy, and (2) to ensure federal agencies’ adherence
15
to the policy in significant decision-making. The Act puts in place a
sweeping national policy, declaring that federal, state, and local governments are:
to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other

13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). It is worth
noting that President Nixon, a Republican, signed the Act into law, illustrating that environmental stewardship was not a partisan issue. National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL
ON ENVTL. QUALITY,

http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).

14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
15. Id. § 4332.
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requirements of present and future generations of Ameri16
cans.
Despite the Act’s short length, application of NEPA, particularly
17
with respect to climate change, is complicated. To explain the evolution of the law with respect to climate change considerations, this
part considers a number of relevant sources. Part I.A describes the
NEPA statute and key regulations that provide further detail on agency compliance with the statute. Part I.B reviews the Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas
18
Emissions (“Draft Guidance”), authored by CEQ, the agency in
charge of administering NEPA. The Draft Guidance, while the most
19
relevant source, is nonetheless limited in its authority. Part I.C then
turns to how the United States courts of appeals have applied NEPA
to climate change. Lastly, Part I.D explores the D.C. Circuit’s recent
holding in New York v. NRC.
A. NEPA and Its Corresponding Regulations
20
Aside from declaring an aspirational environmental policy, the
substance of NEPA’s legal mandates are rather limited. The statute

16. Id. § 4331(a). Congress was not shy in its valuation of the environment or man’s
responsibility for impacting the environment. In fact, Congress declared a national environmental policy in recognition of
the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of
the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population
growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation,
and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man . . . .
Id.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, Draft
NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
(Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Sutley Memorandum], available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100218-nepa-consideration-effects-ghgdraft-guidance.pdf.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. According to NEPA, states that “it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means” to:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc-
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requires all federal agencies to prepare an EIS on major federal actions and proposals for legislation that significantly impact the envi21
ronment. In evaluating whether a proposal meets the threshold impact to warrant an EIS, the agency considers the context of the
proposal as it relates to society, the region, affected interests, and the
22
locality. The agency also must consider the intensity or severity of
the impact including: how much the proposed action impacts public
health, safety, unique characteristics of the area, and the presence of
endangered or threatened species; precedent set by the proposal; the
degree to which the possible effects are unknown; whether the action
may be insignificant individually but significant cumulatively when
considered with other actions; and whether the action threatens a vio23
lation of other federal, state, or local laws. Finally, proposed mitigation measures may be factored into the decision of whether the proposal would have a significant environmental impact thereby
24
necessitating an EIS.

tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest
range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health
or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of
individual choice; (5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities;
and (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Congress went even further and noted that every person “should enjoy a healthful environment” and everyone “has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment.” Id. § 4331(c).
21. Id. § 4332(c) (2006).
22. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (2012). The regulations further clarify, “in the case of a
site-specific action, significance would usually depend upon the effects in the locale rather
than in the world as a whole.” Id.
23. Id. § 1508.27(b).
24. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (Mar. 23, 1981). Where the proposed mitigation
measures result in the project not attaining the threshold “significant” environmental impact, a “finding of no significant impact” (“FONSI”) is issued; in this case, it is known as a
“mitigated FONSI.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2012). Mitigation is defined broadly in the regulations as: avoiding the impact, minimizing impacts, rectifying the impact by repair, rehabilitation, or restoration, reducing the impact, or compensating for the impact. 40 C.F.R.
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If there is doubt as to whether a proposed action will cause significant environmental impacts as to warrant a complete EIS, agencies
25
26
prepare an EA, which can be thought of as a miniature EIS. After
an EA, the federal agency may issue a “finding of no significant im27
pact” and dispose of its duty under NEPA or conclude that the environmental impact of the proposed action would be significant and
28
proceed to complete an EIS.
Where an EIS is required because the federal action is likely to
have significant environmental impacts, it must include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local shortterm uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be im29
plemented.
Further, the subsection (iii) alternatives analysis, which the regulations call “the heart of the environmental impact statement,” must
contain a rigorous evaluation of reasonable alternatives, including an
explanation of alternatives that were eliminated from the detailed
study, an alternative of no action, and mitigation measures not al30
ready in the proposal. In evaluating each alternative, the EIS must
be developed, “providing a clear basis for choice among options by
31
the decisionmaker and the public.” Ultimately the overall purpose

§ 1508.20 (2012). As the cost of an EIS is substantial, there are significant economic advantages to mitigation.
25. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (2012).
26. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2011). The EA is a “concise public document” containing
“brief discussions of the need for the proposal,” “alternatives as required”, and the “agencies and persons consulted.” Id.
27. Even a FONSI requires documentation of how the agency arrived at its conclusion.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13.
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c)–(e).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012).
31. Id.
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of NEPA is to ensure that agencies “look before they leap,” encourag32
ing well-informed decision-making.
Early NEPA case law has made clear that EIS and EA requirements are procedural in nature. In other words, agencies must follow
33
34
the required steps, but they are free to make their own decisions.
So long as the agency has performed the EIS or EA and is fully aware
of the environmental consequences of a proposed action and the alternatives, the agency has satisfied its NEPA burden.
Despite NEPA’s purely procedural reach, it is a frequently pursued vehicle for environmental protection for a number of reasons.
First, EISs are highly time consuming, and delay—while theoretically
only temporary—may ultimately result in abandonment of a pro35
posal. Additionally, a completed EIS or EA may be challenged for
inadequacy, resulting in more delay. And finally, the EIS, if completed correctly, requires thorough consideration of all the environmental impacts of the proposal, making it a useful tool for community
groups raising awareness among the public and elected officials regarding the negative impacts of a project. For all these reasons, NEPA
remains prominent law in environmental protection in the United
36
States and internationally.
32. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) hosts a database containing all
EISs filed since January 2004. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
nepa/eisdata.html? (last updated June 25, 2012).
33. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
(concluding that while NEPA established “‘significant substantive goals for the Nation,’
[it] imposes upon agencies duties that are ‘essentially procedural’” (quoting Vt.. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978))).
34. Id. at 227–28. The Court in Strycker went on to state:
[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot “interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.”
Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
35. For example after the famous case of Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
Disney eventually dropped its proposal to lease land in Mineral King Valley to develop a
ski resort. Mineral King: Breaking Down the Courthouse Door, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earth
justice.org/features/mineral-king-breaking-down-the-courthouse-door (last visited Mar. 1,
2013).
36. See NEPANET, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/nepanet.htm (last updated Oct. 24,
2012) (listing countries that have adopted NEPA).
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B. CEQ Draft Guidance on Considering the Effects of Climate Change
and GHG Emisions
On February 18, 2010, Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of CEQ, issued the
Draft Guidance on how agencies should consider GHG impacts with
respect to NEPA. 37 Although only a draft, 38it is the most direct information available from CEQ on how federal agencies should analyze
effects of GHG emissions and climate change when conducting a
39
NEPA analysis.
The Draft Guidance begins by stating that GHG impacts are rele40
vant to the NEPA analysis. Relying on the minimum threshold of
emissions that must be reported under the Clean Air Act, CEQ suggests that where a proposed action would cause direct annual emis41
sions of 25,000 metric tons or more of CO2-equivalent, “a quantita-

37. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18. The Draft Guidance does not pertain to federal land and resource management actions but instead solicits comments as to how GHG
impacts should be considered in federal actions involving federal land and resource management decisions. Id. at 2. The Draft Guidance was promulgated in response to a petition by the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council, among others. Int’l
Ctr. for Tech. Assessment et al., Petition Requesting that the Council on Environmental
Quality Amend Its Regulations to Clarify that Climate Change Analyses Be Included in Environmental Review Documents (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/
CEQ%20Petition%20Final%20Version%202-28-08.pdf.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 137–141 for a discussion of the limitations of
draft guidances.
39. Interestingly, CEQ had mentioned climate change in a previous draft memorandum to agency heads as early as 1997. It stated, “‘[t]he NEPA process provides an excellent mechanism for consideration of ideas related to global climate change.’” See Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases Into Account in Threshold
Signficance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 48 n.7 (2009) (quoting Draft Memorandum
from Kathleen McGinty, Chairman of Council on Envtl. Quality, to all Federal Agency
NEPA Liaisons (Oct. 8, 1997)).

More formally, in published guidance, CEQ stated,

“[d]irect effects continue to be most important to decisionmakers, in part because they are
more certain. Nonetheless, the importance of . . . climate change, and other cumulative
effects problems has resulted in many efforts to undertake and improve the analysis of
cumulative effects.” COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, at 7 (1997), available at http://ceq.
hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/sec1.pdf.
40. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1.
41. The EPA defines carbon dioxide equivalent as “[a] metric measure used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming poten-
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tive and qualitative assessment may be meaningful to decision makers
42
Where direct annual emissions fall below this
and the public.”
amount, CEQ leaves it up to federal agencies to determine whether
43
the proposed action’s long-term emissions necessitate consideration.
The CEQ is careful to state that the 25,000 metric tons is not “a
threshold of significant effects,” but instead “an indicator of a minimum level of GHG emissions that may warrant some description in
44
the appropriate NEPA analysis.”
While endorsing GHG consideration in NEPA analyses, CEQ
states that GHGs are a global problem resulting from many sources,
each causing “relatively small addition[s],” and thus federal agencies’
EISs and EAs should “reflect this global context and be realistic in fo45
cusing on ensuring that useful information is provided.” The Draft
Guidance offers a list of proposals that may warrant GHG impact consideration: large, solid-waste landfills, energy facilities such as coal46
fired power plants, or methane venting in coal mines. The Draft
Guidance also suggests that projects designed for long-term use and
located in areas vulnerable to experiencing the effects of climate
change warrant climate change consideration, particularly with re47
spect to adaptation potential. In other words, the agencies should
consider these projects’ capacity to adapt to a changing climate.
Once it is determined that GHG emissions merit explicit analysis,
CEQ suggests that agencies set spatial and temporal limits to their
GHG consideration and “focus on aspects of climate change that may
lead to changes in the impacts, sustainability, vulnerability and design
48
of the proposed action.” Where the direct emissions of the project
necessitate an EIS, an agency should: “(1) quantify cumulative emissions over the life of the project; (2) discuss measures to reduce GHG
emissions, including consideration of reasonable alternatives; and (3)
tial (GWP).” Glossary of Climate Change Terms: Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (last updated June 14, 2012).
42. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1.
43. Id. at 1–2.
44. Id. at 2. This qualification creates a pregnant negative. Stating that only direct
emissions greater than 25,000 CO2-equivalent “may warrant some description” in a NEPA
analysis implies that projects without such emissions warrant no discussion of GHG impacts in their NEPA analysis. Id. at 1–2. This is discussed further in Part II.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 2.
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qualitatively discuss the link between such GHG emissions and climate
49
change.” Amongst this general guidance, CEQ warns that “agencies
should recognize the scientific limits of their ability to accurately predict climate change effects, especially of a short-term nature, and not
50
devote effort to analyzing wholly speculative effects.”
In evaluating alternatives to a proposal, CEQ suggests comparing
energy use and mitigation opportunities associated with each alterna51
tive. Additionally, each alternative should be compared for compli52
ance with federal, state, or local goals for energy conservation. The
CEQ asserts that NEPA’s consideration of GHGs and alternative proposals can result in agencies reducing vulnerability to climate change
53
through adaptation and mitigating GHG impacts.
Finally, CEQ notes that NEPA analysis of climate change is likely
to evolve both in regard to the scientific information available as well
54
as to the law and policy in this arena. Thus, it concludes that even
once the Draft Guidance is issued in final form it is subject to change
55
as developments in science, law, and policy occur. In summary, although the subject matter of the Draft Guidance is perfectly germane,
56
its substance is limited.
C. NEPA and Climate Change Case Law in the Federal Courts of
Appeals
Litigation invoking NEPA is abundant and represents one tool in
the litigator’s limited toolbox to reduce GHG emissions. Interestingly, a recent survey found that one-sixth of all climate change litigation
57
is brought through NEPA challenges. The abundance of suits represents environmental advocates’ hope NEPA will elevate climate
change consideration in agency decisionmaking and prevent new pro49. Id. at 3. In calculating direct emissions, the agency should only consider what is
emitted as a result of the agency’s control or authority. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004).
50. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id.
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Emperical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A
New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 57–58 (2012).
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jects with significant GHG implications. As case law reveals, however,
there is significant ambiguity in terms of what is required of federal
agencies under NEPA with respect to climate change. This Part reviews the limited the few cases that have addressed this issue.
As NEPA has been interpreted to be largely procedural, lawyers
litigating NEPA and climate change may bring a limited number of
challenges. Two of the main challenges are: (1) a challenge to an EA
or an EIS for inadequate analysis of the climate impacts of the pro58
posed project, or (2) a challenge to an EA or EIS for inadequate
analysis of alternatives to a project and their respective climate change
59
impacts.
Despite the abundance of NEPA climate change litigation, only
60
61
two circuits, the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, have ruled
on NEPA’s requirement of climate change consideration. Although
circuit courts have found that climate change impacts are appropriate
considerations under NEPA, they have set the bar at two very different
levels: Specifically, the courts differ in terms of their acceptance of the
remote and speculative defense and vary as to the degree of detail required in analyzing GHG impacts.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Searching Standard
The Ninth Circuit is the leader in setting a high bar for climate
change considerations under NEPA. In Center for Biological Diversity v.
62
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the court famously held
that “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is
precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires

58. See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1131
(9th Cir. 2006) (challenging the adequacy of the Final Supplemental EIS for deepening a
channel of the Columbia River).
59. See, e.g., Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 548–49, 554 (8th Cir.
2006) (challenging the adequacy of the Final Supplemental EIS for failing to consider the
GHG impacts of constructing a new rail line for coal delivery as well as alternatives to the
project and their respective emission impacts).
60. See infra Part I.C.1.
61. See infra Part I.C.2.
62. 508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was improper to remand and immediately require an EIS, rather the agency could determine whether to do a revised EA or a
complete EIS, yet nonetheless affirming that the original EA was inadequate), vacated and
superseded on denial of reh’g by 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).

978

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:967

63

agencies to conduct.” At issue in the case was the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) Final Rule setting corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standards for light trucks for
64
Model Years (“MY”) 2008–2011. In the Final Rule, NHTSA adopted
new fuel standards for light trucks, requiring an average of 22.5 miles
per gallon (“mpg”) for MY 2008, 23.1 mpg for MY 2009, and 23.5 mpg
65
for MY 2010. Petitioners challenged NHTSA’s EA and subsequent
FONSI, in addition to challenging the rule as arbitrary and capri66
cious.
The court resoundingly agreed with petitioners’ interpretation of
NEPA requirements. The court reasoned that although the Final
Rule would result in a .02% decrease in emissions, this did not mean
67
that the environmental impacts of the rule were insignificant. Rather, the court stated that the proposed CAFE standards would not
68
reduce carbon emissions but only decrease the rate of growth. Furthermore, the court found the EA’s cumulative impacts analysis inadequate, as “it [did] not evaluate the ‘incremental impact’ that these
69
emissions [would] have on climate change or on the environment.”
Additionally, the court stated, “the fact that ‘climate change is
largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of
[the agency’s] control . . . does not release the agency from the duty
70
of assessing the effects of its actions on global warming.’” The court
even stated that while an individual proposed action might have an
“‘individually minor’ effect on the environment,” such as the .02% delay in emissions, the CAFE standards are “‘collectively significant ac71
tions taking place over a period of time.’” In line with this idea, the
72
court quoted the dissent of Chief Judge Wald in City of Los Angeles v.

63. Id. at 550.
64. Id. at 513. Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, NHTSA is
charged with setting a performance standard of a minimum level of average fuel economy
applicable to vehicle manufacturers. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919 (2006).
65. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 519, 523.
66. Id. at 513–14.
67. Id. at 556.
68. Id. at 549.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 550 (alterations in original).
71. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2007)).
72. Id.
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73

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the first case to hold
74
that climate change considerations were not required under NEPA.
Chief Judge Wald, ahead of her time, stated: “[W]e cannot afford to
ignore even modest contributions to global warming. If global warming is the result of the cumulative contributions of myriad sources,
any one modest in itself, is there not a danger of losing the forest by
75
closing our eyes to the felling of the individual trees?” Thus, the
Ninth Circuit set a high precedent for GHG considerations required
under NEPA and did not allow an agency to skirt this responsibility
despite the cumulative nature of climate change.
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Deferential Approach
Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit, while also reaching the conclusion that GHG emissions are appropriate considerations under NEPA,
implied a less searching standard. In Mid States Coalition for Progress v.
76
Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a $1.4 billion proposal, which the Surface Transportation Board had approved
and dubbed the “largest and most challenging rail construction pro77
posal” ever before the Board. The project involved 280 miles of new
rail construction and 600 miles of rail upgrades, the purpose of which
was to transport coal from mines to power plants more quickly and at
78
79
less cost. Although a 5,000-page draft EIS was prepared, the Eighth
Circuit held that the EIS was inadequate as it failed to consider in80
creased emissions that could have resulted from the project.
The court described how the price of coal would impact its demand:

73. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc’y v.
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
74. See id. at 481–83 (dismissing on the merits the Natural Resources Defense Council’s petition that the National Transit Highway Administration was required to prepare
“an EIS in order to consider the adverse climatic effects of the increase in fossil fuel consumption that would result from setting a CAFE standard lower than 27.5 mpg”).
75. Id. at 501 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
76. 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 532, 550.
78. Id. at 532–33.
79. Id. at 533.
80. Id. at 550. A number of emissions were of concern from the project, including
nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, particulates, and mercury. Id. at 548.
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[T]he proposition that the demand for coal will be unaffected by an increase in availability and a decrease in price,
which is the stated goal of the project, is illogical at best.
The increased availability of inexpensive coal will at the very
least make coal a more attractive option to future entrants
into the utilities market when compared with other potential
fuel sources, such as nuclear power, solar power, or natural
gas. Even if this project will not affect the short-term demand for coal, which is possible since most existing utilities
are single-source dependent, it will most assuredly affect the
nation’s long-term demand for coal . . . . 81
The court firmly rejected the project’s proponents’ position that the
effects of increased coal generation did not have to be addressed because coal-hauling contracts had not been finalized and therefore, the
82
effects were too speculative. Instead the court held that the “nature
of the effect . . . is far from speculative”; it is only the extent of the effect that is speculative and, as such, it must be evaluated under
83
NEPA. Thus, the court initially set a high standard for NEPA consideration of GHG emissions.
Nonetheless, after remand and a supplemental EIS, the court’s
searching standard morphed into deference. After the Surface
Transportation Board approved the rail line, the Sierra Club peti84
tioned the Eighth Circuit for review. The court rejected the petition
85
for review, finding the supplemental EIS sufficient. While the Board
had used modeling and found that “on both national and regional
levels, projected air emissions for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide, and mercury associated with the small increase of additional coal usage would be less than 1%,” it was unable to determine
86
the environmental impacts at the local level. Perhaps most telling,
the Eighth Circuit approved of the Board’s conclusion that the local

81. Id. at 549.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006).
85. Id. at 556.
86. Id. at 555 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a point of
comparison, the Ninth Circuit’s held that only a .02% decrease in emissions was significant
enough as to preclude a FONSI. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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impacts were “‘speculative’” and “‘ultimately unforeseeable,’” and it
87
was thus unnecessary to require increased mitigation.
To date, only two federal courts of appeals have dealt with climate change consideration under NEPA. While they have facially
reached the same result that climate change impacts are appropriate
88
considerations in an EA and EIS, the courts in practice have demanded two significantly different standards of review and two different interpretations of what level of emissions impacts are speculative
or significant.
D. New York v. NRC
In contrasting how the federal circuit courts have dealt with the
remote and speculative defense in regard to GHG emissions, it is
worthwhile to consider how the defense is treated generally under
NEPA. New York v. NRC offers one point of comparison. In that case,
four states—New York, New Jersey, Vermont, and Connecticut—the
Prairie Island Indian Community, and environmental groups petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC” or “Commission”) rulemaking, which petitioners alleged was
89
in violation of NEPA. Specifically, petitioners challenged a 2010 update to the agency’s Commission’s Waste Confidence Decision
(“WCD”), which serves as the basis for its policy on the storage and
90
disposal of nuclear waste.

87. Mayo Found., 472 F.3d at 556 (quoting Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. Constr. Into
the Powder River Basin, STB Finance Docket No. 33407 at 17 (Feb. 15, 2006)) [hereinafter
STB 2006 Decision]. The Board maintained that in order for the effects not to be speculative, it “‘would need to know not only what existing or new power plants would actually use
DM&E’s service, but also whether they would otherwise not burn PRB coal, not burn as
much coal, or burn a different mix of coal.’” Id. at 555–56 (quoting STB 2006 Decision at
13).
88. Furthermore, it is likely that future courts will also conclude that climate change
impacts are appropriate considerations under NEPA, especially after Massachusetts v. EPA
and the Supreme Court’s recognition that EPA may regulate GHG emissions as a significant environmental problem. 549 U.S. 497, 521–26 (2007).
89. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
90. Id. at 475. The original WCD was published in 1984 as a result of Minnesota v.
NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979), in which the D.C. Circuit remanded an NRC decision
to allow the expansion of spent-fuel pools at two nuclear plants. New York, 681 F.3d. at
474–75.
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In the original WCD, the Commission made five “Waste Confidence Findings”: (1) spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”) may be safely disposed of in a mined geologic repository; (2) by 2007–2009, such a repository will exist; (3) until the repository is available, waste will be
safely managed in the interim; (4) SNF may be safely stored at nuclear
plants thirty years or more after the licensed life of each plant; and
91
(5) if needed, safe, independent storage will become available. The
92
Commission revised the WCD in 1990 and reviewed it without altera93
tion in 1999.
In its 2010 revision, the Commission reaffirmed three of the orig94
inal findings and altered findings number two and four. Finding
number two, which had previously concluded that a permanent geologic repository would be available in the first quarter of the twentyfirst century, now states that a repository will be available “when nec95
essary,” removing any reference to a specific date. Finding number
four also was revised so that SNF, which previously could be stored on
site for thirty years beyond the licensed life of a plant, now may be
96
stored for sixty years. After the revisions, the Commission adopted a
new Temporary Storage Rule (“TSR”), bringing the Commission’s
97
regulations into conformance with the WCD revisions. Petitioners
98
challenged these revisions and the new TSR in New York v. NRC.
Petitioners brought suit alleging that the WCD is a major federal
action and that the Commission did not perform an EIS as required
99
by NEPA. Specifically, petitioners argued that the Commission violated NEPA because its conclusion that permanent storage will be
available “when necessary”: (1) failed to take into consideration the

91. Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,659–60 (Aug. 31, 1984).
92. See Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,472, 38,474, 38,505 (Sept.
18, 1990) (updating the WCD due to new understandings on waste disposal and changing
the date that a repository would be available to store spent fuel to 2025).
93. Waste Confidence Decision Review: Status, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,005, 68,006–07 (Dec. 6,
1999).
94. Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037, 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010).
95. New York, 681 F.3d at 475.
96. Id.
97. Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel After Cessation of Reactor Operation, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,032, 81,032 (Dec. 23, 2010); 10 C.F.R.
§ 51.23(a) (2012).
98. New York, 681 F.3d at 475.
99. Id. at 474, 476.
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societal and political barriers that have prevented a permanent repository from being constructed thus far; (2) provided no meaningful
definition of the term “necessary;” and (3) failed to consider the possibility that a permanent repository may never be built and the envi100
Additionally, petitioners
ronmental impacts of such an outcome.
contested the Commission’s FONSI regarding prolonged temporary
storage of SNF at nuclear sites for sixty years beyond a plant’s li101
cense. Petitioners also faulted the analysis because there was no investigation into the impacts of pool fires, the likelihood of which, alt102
hough low, is not so low as to be “remote or speculative.”
The D.C. Circuit granted the petition for review and vacated the
103
Specifically, the court
Commission’s WCD changes and the TSR.
held that the Commission’s rulemaking was a major federal action,
104
subjecting it to NEPA. Additionally, the court determined that the
Commission’s analysis of the risks posed by SNF was inadequate because (1) the analysis ignored the possibility that a permanent storage
repository may not exist; and (2) the Commission failed to analyze the
“future dangers and key consequences” of allowing SNF to be stored
on site at a nuclear plant for sixty years beyond the expiration of the
105
plant’s license.
In regard to the court’s conclusion that the WCD rulemaking was
a major federal action, the court reasoned that “NEPA requires that
‘environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the
decision making process concerning a particular action’” and that the
WCD is such a “stage” due to the preclusive effect the WCD findings
106
The court noted that while it
have on future licensing decisions.
100. Id. at 477.
101. Petitioners alleged that the FONSI was inadequate because the Commission did
not review the risks with respect to each plant and its unique characteristics. Id. at 479.
Petitioners further stated that even if the Commission’s generic EA of extending temporary storage of SNF from thirty to sixty years was appropriate, it was nonetheless insufficient because the Commission looked at past leaks only and did not consider the risks of
other future leaks. Id. at 479–80.
102. Id. at 480. Petitioners also asserted that the Commission violated NEPA because it
did not investigate non-health environmental impacts from allowing SNF to be stored sixty
years at nuclear sites. Id.
103. Id. at 483.
104. Id. at 476.
105. Id. at 473.
106. Id. at 476 (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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gives considerable deference to an agency’s decision to complete an
107
EA versus an EIS, if an agency chooses to prepare an EA only,
the agency must 1) “accurately identif[y] the relevant environmental concern,” 2) take a “hard look at the problem in
preparing its EA,” 3) make a “convincing case for its finding
of no significant impact,” and 4) show that even if a significant impact will occur, “changes or safeguards in the project
108
sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.”
The court then reviewed the Commission’s change to WCD finding number two—that a permanent repository would be available
“when necessary.” The court found the Commission’s analysis deficient, as the Commission “did not examine the environmental effects
109
The court noted that, under
of failing to establish a repository.”
NEPA, such an analysis would be unnecessary if the probability of
Failure to build a repository is “so low as to be ‘remote and speculative,’ or if the combination of probability and harm is sufficiently min110
imal.” According to the court, however, current uncertainty regarding whether a repository will be built places it beyond the “too remote
111
Indeed, the possibility of a permanent
and speculative” threshold.
repository not being built is a “far cry” from “remote and speculative,”
and “[t]he Commission can and must assess the potential environ112
mental effects of [a failure to establish a repository].”
Finally, the court reviewed the Commission’s alterations to the
WCD finding that SNF may be safely stored at a nuclear plant for sixty
113
The court again held that the
years after the plant’s licensed life.
Commission’s EA and resulting FONSI were inadequate—this time
because the analysis was not forward-looking and only considered the

107. Id. at 477.
108. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
109. Id. at 478.
110. Id. at 478–79.
111. See id. at 478 (“[T]he EA is insufficient because a finding that ‘reasonable assurance exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available when necessary,’ does not describe a probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.” (internal citation omitted)); see also id. at 479 (“Here, a
‘reasonable assurance’ that permanent storage will be available is a far cry from finding the
likelihood of nonavailability to be ‘remote and speculative.’”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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risks of future leaks similar to those that have already occurred.
The court also held that the analysis was insufficient for its failure to
investigate both the consequences of pool fires as well as the probability of such fires occurring; according to the court, the possibility of a
pool fire is not so “remote and speculative” as to preclude an analysis
115
of its consequences. While the court faulted NRC’s analysis for a variety of reasons, it rejected the petitioners’ argument that the analysis
116
had to review each plant and its risks individually. The court nevertheless found the analysis so flawed as not to merit the court’s defer117
ence.
In summary, the court held that the Commission’s WCD findings
constituted a federal action subject to NEPA, and the Commission’s
EA was insufficient as it did not adequately evaluate the environmen118
While the court did not find it necestal risks of NRC’s decisions.
sary for the analysis concerning the impacts of storing SNF for sixty
years to be site-specific, it nonetheless avowed that the analysis must
be substantially forward-looking and, unless the probability of a risk is
“effectively zero,” the reviewing agency must “account for the conse119
quences of each risk.”
II. ANALYSIS
One can hardly doubt from the number of NEPA challenges
brought annually, and the frequency with which the challenges involve climate change, that environmentalists believe NEPA is a viable
method to tackle climate change. Unfortunately, the state of the CEQ
120
regulations and the holdings thus far by the federal courts of appeals suggest that NEPA’s review of climate change impacts—
114. Id. at 481. The court disapproved of NRC’s reasoning that, because past leaks
from spent fuel have caused little harm, extending storage of SNF for an additional thirty
years will also cause no significant impacts. Id. Instead, the court stated that “a proper
analysis of the risks would necessarily look forward to examine the effects of the additional
time in storage, as well as examin[e] past leaks.” Id. More specifically, the court stated
that just because past leaks have not been harmful does not address whether and how future leaks might occur and their potential impacts. Id.
115. Id. at 481–82.
116. Id. at 480.
117. Id. at 481.
118. Id. at 473.
119. Id. at 483.
120. See infra Part II.A.
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including when such impacts must be considered in an EA or EIS, the
detail necessary in the analysis, and therefore NEPA’s effectiveness in
121
abating emissions—is still very much undetermined. Parts II.A and
II.B analyze each source of authority on the matter and find that the
climate change considerations required by the courts and the executive branch to satisfy NEPA, thus far have been cursory. In Part II.C,
the Comment turns to the New York v. NRC ruling to argue that it has
the capacity to raise the bar of climate change analysis under NEPA.
A. CEQ Draft Guidence Leaves Much to Be Desired: Both Substantively
and Procedurally
Although one would expect the agency in charge of issuing guidance and regulations on NEPA to provide a definitive answer as to the
role of climate change considerations in an EIS or EA, CEQ’s Draft
Guidance provides little assistance on the matter. This is the case
both substantively and procedurally.
The substance of the Draft Guidance does not provide much direction as it leaves the bulk of instances in which climate change
122
For example, recould be considered up to individual agencies.
garding cumulative GHG emissions of a proposal, CEQ sets no
threshold amount at which cumulative emissions trigger consideration in an EIS or EA; instead, CEQ allows each individual agency to
make its own determination of when cumulative GHG emissions must
123
This is in contrast to CEQ’s direction
be addressed under NEPA.
that proposals with direct annual emissions of more than 25,000 metric tons “may warrant some description in the appropriate NEPA analy124
sis.” Thus, even where annual emissions exceed 25,000 metric tons,
there is still room to avoid calculating climate change impacts or to
125
provide only minimal review. Further encouraging marginalization
of climate change impacts, the Draft Guidance reminds agencies that
climate change is a global problem, so agencies should be “realistic”

121. See infra Part II.B.
122. See supra Part I.B.
123. See supra text accompanying note 43.
124. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis added).
125. See Jeff Thaler, Greenhouse Gas Litigation and NEPA: A Split in the Courts, 5 ABA
TRENDS 12, 12–13 (2012) (arguing that climate change consideration required under
NEPA will remain in flux and increasingly divergent unless the Supreme Court rules on
the matter or unless Congress acts comprehensively to regulate emissions).
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126

to ensure the information provided is useful.
This statement rein127
The CEQ also notes that
forces under-inclusion of information.
“agencies should recognize the scientific limits of their ability to accurately predict climate change effects . . . and not devote effort to ana128
lyzing wholly speculative effects,” as if advancing climate change
considerations in NEPA analysis but in the same breath retracting it.
This sentence in particular gives significant fodder for the affirmative
“remote and speculative” defense agencies may raise to preclude cli129
In other words, defendmate change impacts from an EIS or EA.
ants could point to this language as proof that even CEQ recognizes
climate change impacts as “remote and speculative,” rendering moot
a challenge to an EIS or EA as inadequate for failure to consider GHG
impacts.
Where agencies have resolved to consider climate change ramifications of a proposal—because annual emissions are over 25,000 met130
ric tons or the agencies have done so on its own accord—CEQ di131
rects agencies to discuss possibilities to reduce GHG emissions. UnUnfortunately, CEQ then provides a very limited set of examples that
may warrant a discussion of GHG impacts and opportunities for miti126. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
127. Professor Madeline June Kass reached a similar conclusion about the previous
guidelines. See Kass, supra note 39, at 58–67 (stating that “the lead agency need not evaluate (or closely evaluate) climate related impacts—and may even deem it inappropriate to
do so”).
128. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
129. Giving CEQ the benefit of the doubt, it does not appear that its prescription
against analyzing “wholly speculative effects” of climate change was done intentionally to
prohibit climate change consideration in NEPA analyses altogether. Rather, it appears its
prescription was meant to limit how much information should be included in such an
analysis. See id. (directing agencies to focus on “significant source[s] of GHGs” but warning them not to focus on “wholly speculative efforts”). Nonetheless, it would not take
much lawyering to use CEQ’s own language to argue that climate impacts are not only not
required, but are discouraged.
130. See id. at 1 (establishing the threshold limit). One benefit to specifying a threshold of direct emissions triggering an EIS is the pressure this creates on projects that would
normally be over 25,000 metric tons to incorporate mitigation measures to go below the
threshold and avoid an EIS. For an interesting discussion of how NEPA could be used to
“tip the balance in favor of this form of voluntary mitigation,” see Amy L. Stein, Climate
Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
473, 538 (2010).
131. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
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gation: “approval of a large solid waste landfill; approval of energy facilities such as a coal-fired power plant; or authorization of a methane
132
Although CEQ does not specify that the list is
venting coal mine.”
exhaustive, the nature of these examples further suggests that GHG
emissions are only required in an EIS or EA for projects with the most
133
Thus, ultimately, agencies receive no
direct emissions impacts.
134
more direction substantively than they had previously, or perhaps
less optimistic, the Draft Guidance suggests that an analysis of climate
change impacts has a limited role in an EIS or EA and is only re135
quired in the most obvious of projects.
Procedurally, the Draft Guidance also fails to provide concrete
authority. First issued in February 2010, the Draft Guidance remains
136
Per the Supreme
merely a guideline and a draft guideline at that.
137
Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, agency interpretations, including guidance documents, are “entitled to consideration . . . . But . . .
courts properly may accord less weight to such guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the
138
The amount of deference, Skidmore v. Swift &
force of law . . . .”
139
Co. instructs, “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in [the
guidance documents] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac140
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”
Thus, the draft nature of the guidelines, along with the fact that the

132. Id. at 3.
133. Each of these examples would likely cause significant GHG emissions. Had CEQ
listed projects with less obvious GHG emissions impacts, such as building a new federal
building, approving a permit for a new airport, or building a new highway, it would have
suggested that GHG impacts should be considered more broadly.
134. Previous CEQ guidance on the role of climate change impacts in an EIS or EA was
extremely limited and was couched in a memorandum addressing how cumulative impacts
should be analyzed under NEPA. See supra note 39.
135. See supra notes 124–128, 132–133 and accompanying text.
136. It should be noted that the earlier guidance issued by CEQ also shared this problem. See supra note 39.
137. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
138. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
139. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
140. Id. at 140.
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Draft Guidance explicitly states that it is subject to change, suggest
that the Draft Guidance is not likely to persuade.
In conclusion, the Draft Guidance is not of much consequence,
and it fails to give NEPA a meaningful role in combating climate
142
Specifically, rather than affirmatively state that climate
change.
change is neither “remote” nor “speculative,” which would bar an affirmative defense in NEPA challenges, CEQ makes contradictory
statements. In one paragraph, CEQ states that climate change should
be considered in EISs and EAs, and then in the next, it limits such
analysis to only the most direct sources of emissions and to a re143
strained discussion of such impacts.
B. Not Surprisingly, the Courts Are Equally Conflicted in Assessing the
Adequacy of Climate Change Analysis
In 2011, there were forty-eight federal courts of appeals opinions
144
Interestingly, none of them dealt with climate
on NEPA litigation.
change; it is only a matter of time, however, until additional circuits
145
While it appears likely, especially after the Sutackle the issue.
preme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision, that GHG emissions will
146
be held appropriate considerations under NEPA, the standard of
147
review is likely to vary. Specifically, in determining the adequacy of

141. See supra text accompanying note 55.
142. See James R. Holcomb, IV, NEPA and Climate Change: After the CEQ’s Draft Guidance,
41 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 268 (2011) (concluding similarly that the CEQ guidelines are
largely a failure due to their inability to provide substantive guidance on when and how to
analyze GHG and climate change effects).
143. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. But see notes 123–130 and accompanying text.
144. Environmental Impact Assessment 2011 Annual Report, 2011 ABA ENV’T ENERGY, &
RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 347, 347 (2011). The Ninth Circuit decided twenty-five of the
forty-eight decisions. Id.
145. As one-sixth of climate change litigation is filed under NEPA, Markell & Ruhl, supra note 57, at 57, it is only a matter of time before additional courts of appeals must deal
with the matter.
146. It is highly likely as Massachusetts v. EPA recognized the magnitude of the environmental problems caused by GHG emissions and held that EPA has authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act. 549 U.S. 497, 521–26, 528 (2007).
147. For example, will the standard of review be the searching standard the Ninth Circuit has imposed or will it be more deferential like the Eighth Circuit’s standard? See supra
Part I.C.
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the emissions analysis in EISs and EAs, courts will vary significantly, as
148
illustrated by Center for Biological Diversity and Mayo.
While the cases are not perfectly analogous—one dealt proactively with CAFE standards meant to conserve energy resources while the
other dealt with the construction of a railway to deliver coal more
quickly and cheaply to power plants—some observations can be
149
It appears that the Ninth Circuit will conduct a thorough
drawn.
review, scrutinizing the adequacy of EISs and EAs for their analysis of
150
Despite the
GHG emissions among other environmental impacts.
fact that the CAFE standards at issue in Center for Biological Diversity
would have led to a reduction in carbon emissions, the Ninth Circuit
still found the NEPA review inadequate as the agency did not consid151
er making further reductions. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Mayo
held that the NEPA review of environmental impacts, including climate change, was adequate where the project would result in an increase in emissions and where the air emission impacts were not de152
The court held that the NEPA analysis,
termined at a local level.
which concluded that the project would increase emissions regionally
153
and nationally by only one percent, was sufficient. Yet, it is not surprising that the national emissions impacts would be less than one
154
Had the
percent, for there are many sources of GHG emissions.
Eighth Circuit required a more local review, however, the emission
155
impacts most certainly would have been larger than one percent.
148. See supra Part I.C.
149. It should be noted that the agency at issue in Mayo was not tasked expressly with
any conservation goals, a significant difference worth pointing out which may have had an
impact on the emissions analysis.
150. See supra Part I.C.1.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69.
152. See supra Part I.C.2.
153. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
154. See Kass, supra note 39, at 60–63 for what she refers to as the “Death-by-aThousand-Puffs” problem of NEPA, created because there are so many sources of GHG
emissions that each individual source may seem insignificant, but cumulatively creates a
great problem.
155. By localizing the problem of GHG emissions—as opposed to comparing sources
nationally—more future GHG sources would meet the threshold significance requirement,
thereby encouraging more mitigation. While a planned factory may be a small source of
GHG emissions nationally (thus failing to meet the significant impact required for an EIS),
by narrowing the focus locally, the factory’s emissions likely would be sizable, triggering an
EIS and the benefits that stem from it.
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Like so many things, the devil is in the details. Emissions from a
proposed project will almost always seem insignificant when compared nationally or regionally. This approach is a bit like the dieter
who continuously concludes, “what is one more cookie?” Like Chief
Judge Wald wrote in her dissent many years ago, are we not missing
the forest for the trees if we include climate change impacts in an EIS
156
and EA, but do so only with a national or regional focus? To assess
accurately the environmental impacts of a project, the emissions im157
In this way, the agency is
pact review should be much more local.
better informed of the environmental impacts of the proposal, meet158
ing the purpose of NEPA.
Even more troubling about the Eighth Circuit’s ruling is its acceptance of the agency’s conclusion that the local air quality effects of
the proposal to deliver coal more quickly and cheaply to the power
159
plants were “speculative” and “ultimately unforeseeable.” While the
Eighth Circuit originally stated that “it is almost certainly true—that
the proposed project will increase the long-term demand for coal and
160
any adverse effects that result from burning coal,” this searching
standard seems to have evaporated in the final Mayo opinion in which
the court accepted the defendants’ argument that the local air quality
161
impacts were too difficult to predict and were merely speculative.
162
The court’s ultimate conclusion is a far cry from the first remand.
The court essentially adopted the policy that a NEPA review is sufficient when some of the environmental impacts are uncovered, as opposed to the comprehensive and proactive approach suggested by the
163
Ninth Circuit.
The conclusions that can be drawn from these cases are: (1)
while “remote and speculative” may not be a defense to avoid climate
change considerations in EISs generally, it is still a defense that is
raised regarding cumulative effects analyzed nationally or regional156. See supra text accompanying note 75.
157. This solution also avoids the problem Professor Kass dubbed “No-Project-LeftBehind,” in which every project that increases GHGs requires an EIS, creating significant
administrative challenges. Kass, supra note 39, at 66–68.
158. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
160. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir.
2003).
161. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part I.C.1.
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164

ly; (2) while nominal progress is being made to include climate
change considerations in NEPA analysis, there is much more progress
165
to be made; and (3) if, after only two circuits have reviewed climate
change impacts under NEPA, there is already a lack of uniformity regarding the details required to pass an adequacy challenge, then the
case law in this area is likely to become even more diverse as addition166
al federal courts of appeals review this issue.
C. New York v. NRC and the Opportunity It Poses
Although the NEPA challenge brought by petitioners against
NRC did not argue inadequate change analysis, the ruling nonetheless sets a new point of reference for NEPA and the “remote and
167
This Part of the Comment argues that this new
speculative” issue.
reference point should be used in future NEPA challenges (1) to rebut any remote and speculative justifications for avoiding a NEPA
analysis of the cumulative climate change impacts of proposals and
(2) to ensure that the level of detail regarding the climate change impacts is sufficient.
Although nuclear power and the threats posed by storing spent
fuel are quite different from those posed by climate change, there are
significant similarities. First, the magnitude of potential harm is similar. While the harm posed from spent nuclear waste is potentially
more localized, if one considers the harm climate change is predicted
to bring globally from severe weather events, droughts, and flooding,
168
Second, the
the overall environmental impacts are just as deadly.
“uncertainty” of the risk and thus the ability to predict the harm that
will result is equally difficult. Scientists disagree, but spent nuclear

164. See supra Part I.C.2.
165. See supra Parts II.A–B. For an in-depth review of the cursory nature of the limited
EISs containing climate change considerations, see Stein, supra note 130, at 477. Professor
Amy L. Stein concluded that historically, ninety-nine percent of EAs result in a FONSI and
studied every EIS completed by the Bureau of Land Management from 2007–2008. Id. Of
the thirty-five EISs completed in that timeframe, thirteen made no mention of climate
change, seven only contained stock language on the matter, and only fifteen quantified
GHG emissions with only three discussing GHG mitigation. Id.
166. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part I.D.
168. For a discussion on the future impacts of climate change see Caleb W. Christopher, Success by A Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing
Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 559–60 (2008).
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waste may remain radioactive for 10,000 to 1,000,000 years.
Imagine the difficulties of a NEPA analysis projected that far into the future. While climate change models frequently show the difficulty in
precisely predicting what climate change impacts will occur where
and at what moment, one would be hard pressed, when comparing
the environmental impacts of spent radioactive waste and climate
170
change, to claim that the impacts of climate change are less certain.
In New York v. NRC, the court determined that the possibility that
a permanent repository for spent fuel would not be built was a “far
cry” from the too “remote and speculative” threshold precluding en171
vironmental impact analysis. Yet, the likelihood that climate change
and its predicted impacts will occur is just as likely, if not more like172
It would be inconsistent to allow the environmental impacts of
ly.
proposals affecting climate change to go unaddressed, even when lo173
calized and difficult to define with precision, as in the Mayo case,
but to insist that the environmental impacts of spent fuel lacking a
174
The comparison is made
permanent repository must be analyzed.
not to suggest that the environmental impacts of spent fuel should
169. Testimony of Robert Meyers, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r for the Office of
Air and Radiation, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality Comm. on Energy and Com., U. S. House of Representatives (July 15, 2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/110_2007_2008/2008_0715_rjm.pdf

(ex-

plaining the range in predictions of how long spent nuclear fuel remains radioactive).
170. The most authoritative reports on the future impacts of climate change are from
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Its most recent comprehensive report
from 2007 concludes that by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will be exposed to increased water stress and the country’s agricultural yield could be reduced by
50%. It predicts that coastal areas of Asia, particularly the heavily populated areas, will be
at great risk of flooding, and endemic morbidity and mortality from disease will rise due to
floods and droughts. The analysis continues with specific forecasts for each country.
North America is expected to have decreased agricultural yields in the south and an increase in yields elsewhere. Heat waves in cities are expected to increase in number, intensity, and duration with negative health impacts. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf.
171. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
172. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 170 at 7–8 (discussing the “high agreement” among scientists that changes to the climate are “very likely” to
be more significant in the twenty-first century than they were in the twentieth).
173. See supra Part I.C.2.
174. See supra Part I.D.
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not be accounted for, but rather that increases—and decreases —in
GHG emissions have equal environmental impacts and require equal176
From this perspective it is realy detailed environmental analysis.
sonable to draw from NEPA case law concerning nuclear impacts to
inform new NEPA litigation concerning climate impacts. As such,
New York v. NRC arms attorneys with a significant reference point to
rebut the “remote and speculative” defense that continues to surface.
Next, where courts hold that climate change impacts are required under NEPA, the case also provides fodder for a thorough
analysis, including localized effects, as opposed to only the cursory re177
view that characterized Mayo. If, under New York v. NRC, the federal
agency is held to a high standard of NEPA review before changing its
regulations on the storage of SNF on site for sixty years beyond a
178
plant’s licensed life, so too should the climate change impacts of
179
other federal agencies be equally scrutinized.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the role that NEPA will play in curbing U.S. GHG
emissions is still very much undecided. 180 While federal courts of appeals are likely to continue to hold that GHG emissions are appropri181
ate considerations under NEPA, when such an analysis is required
and the standard of review used in determining the adequacy of such
182
The Draft Guidance authored by
an analysis remains unknown.
183
CEQ leaves this decision largely to each individual agency. The only
175. The court in Center for Biological Diversity, for example, considered a case in which a
federal proposal would decrease emissions. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 556 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was improper to
remand and immediately require an EIS, rather the agency could determine whether to
do a revised EA or a complete EIS, yet nonetheless affirming that the original EA was inadequate), vacated and superseded on denial of reh’g by 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
176. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 67.
177. See supra Part I.C.2; see also supra note 165.
178. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
179. For an argument against increasing the standard of review of climate change considerations under NEPA, see C. Grady Moore, III et al., Indirect Impacts and Climate Change:
Assessing NEPA’s Reach, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, at 30, 35 (2009).
180. See supra Parts I.B–C.
181. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part II.B.
183. See supra Part II.A.
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circuit courts that have dealt with the issue thus far have diverged, further highlighting the quandary and the range of opinions that are
likely to be issued without leadership from CEQ, Congress, or the
184
President. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has acted proactive185
ly and has taken its judicial review of EISs seriously, setting precedent that even where a project will reduce GHG emissions, its EIS may
186
The
still be inadequate for failing to consider further reductions.
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a far more deferential
standard of review, accepting the assertion that GHG emissions and
187
their impacts are too difficult to predict. Additionally, it established
precedent that projects causing a one-percent increase in national
188
While this conclusion may seem reaemissions are insignificant.
sonable, it is in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit precedent that even
189
a .02% decrease in emissions is significant.
For the environmental lawyer interested in, at the very least, stabilizing U.S. GHG emissions, NEPA is one avenue worthy of pursuit.
As NEPA’s utility in curbing climate change continues to be determined through litigation, environmental advocates should turn to
NEPA case law, beyond climate change, to overcome agency argu190
ments against thorough consideration of GHG impacts in EISs. Particularly, this should be done to overcome the “remote and specula191
In overcoming this
tive” defense defendants will predictably raise.
obstacle, the New York v. NRC decision provides environmental advo192
The courts have been
cates with a poignant point of reference.
dealing for years with difficult-to-predict, far-off-in-the-future potential
impacts in the nuclear context, but they have nonetheless settled on a
193
As the environmental impacts from
searching standard of review.
climate change are equally damaging as the hazards posed by spent
nuclear fuel, it is appropriate to import the searching standard

184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.B.
186. See supra Part I.C.1.
187. See supra Part I.C.2.
188. See supra Part I.C.2.
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. See supra Part II.C.
191. See supra Part II.C.
192. See supra Part I.D.
193. See supra Part I.D.
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adopted in New York v. NRC.
By turning to New York v. NRC, environmental advocates can ensure that NEPA plays a meaningful role in
reducing U.S. emissions.

194. See supra Part II.C.

